Abstract. Government policies are more important and pervasive than natural endowments in determining competitiveness of agri-food sector. One of the most important policy areas are agricultural policies. The aim of this paper is to identify the differences in levels and structures of support for agricultural producers in the EU and US over the 1986-2016 period. The study relies on data retrieved from the "Producer and Consumer Support Estimates Database" of the OECD. The following indicators of agricultural support were used: TSE, % TSE, PSE, % PSE, MPS, GSSE, TCT, NAC and NPC. Both the EU and the US still heavily support their agricultural sectors. However, positive developments took place in the structure of support which means a gradual substitution of price support measures with payments having less distortive effects on market and trade processes. Irrespective of changes to the nature of support, which have already taken place, it may be assumed that in the economies considered, there is still a potential to introduce less trade distorting and more market oriented policies. The EU provides the agricultural producers with twice as much support (measured with the % PSE index) as the US, and the EU market is covered by stronger customs protection measures.
Introduction
The EU and the US are the largest players of world trade in agri-food products. In 2016, the value of agri-food exports from the EU and from the US was USD 521.4 billion and USD 135.6 billion, respectively, representing nearly 38 % and 10 % of world exports (UNCTADstat, 2018). However, considering that the Single European Market (SEM) 1 represents almost ¾ of the EU's trade flows, and taking account only of trade volumes with non-EU countries (USD 137.5 billion in 2016), the shares of the countries considered in the global food trade were at a nearly equal level of around 10 %. On one hand, despite a relatively small value of bilateral trade, the EU and US are important trade partners (Pawlak K., 2017) , but on the other, they compete with each other.
According to Bienkowski (1995) , the macroeconomic determinants of international competitive capacity include the national socio-economic system and government policy, next to the size, quality, structure and efficiency of owned production resources and the ability to impact the international economic environment. The importance of the government policy for the development of competitive advantages of the agri-food sector is also noted by Dunmore (1986) , Brinkman (1987) , Harrison and Kennedy (1997) , Van Duren, Martin and Westgren (1991)2, Abbott and Bredahl (1994) , and Prus and Drzazdzynska (2017) . As emphasized by Dunmore (1986) , government policies are more important and pervasive than natural endowments in determining competitiveness and comparative advantage, especially in the longer term, when they become the source of the "dynamics" of comparative advantage. According to the author, the three most important policy areas are: domestic macroeconomic policies, domestic farm policies, and foreign trade and agricultural policies (Dunmore J. C., 1986). Abbott and Bredahl (1994) also pay considerable attention to trade and agricultural policies as the determinants of international competitiveness of the agri-food sector. In the context of the on-going rivalry in the international agricultural market, and considering the agricultural policy as a primary determinant of competitiveness of the agri-food sector, it is necessary to ask the question about the level and structure of agricultural support in the countries playing the key role in world trade. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to identify the differences in levels and structures of support for agricultural producers in the EU and US over the 1986-2016 period.
Data and research methods
This study relies on data retrieved from the "Producer and Consumer Support Estimates 
Research results and discussion
The TSE is the OECD's broadest indicator of agricultural support. Over the past decades, both the US and the EU have provided substantial government support for their agricultural sectors. In absolute terms, from 2014 to 2016, the total costs incurred by the society to finance agricultural support in EU countries was USD 115.9 billion, on average, representing 36 % of total transfers allocated for that purpose in OECD countries (Table 1 ). In the US, the average annual value of transfers to the agricultural sector and agricultural producers was by nearly ¼ smaller (USD 88.4 billion) than in the EU in that period. However, at the same time, it was more than 80 % higher than agricultural support allocated in 1986-1988. An important insight is provided by the analysis of TSE expressed as a percentage value. Despite the growth of support delivered to the agricultural sector and producers in absolute terms, the overall burden of agricultural support on the EU and US economies has declined since the mid-1980s, as measured by total support as percentage of GDP. In the EU countries (considered as a union between 28 Member States), the total agricultural support went down from 2.6 % of GDP in 1986-1988 to 0.7 % of GDP in 2014-2016 whereas in the US, the share of transfers to the agricultural sector and agricultural producers in GDP declined from 1.0 % to 0.5 % over the same period. But public policy support continues to be important for the agricultural sectors of the EU and USA. In those countries, the ratio of TSE to the total production value (at farm gate) was around 31 % and 23 %, respectively, compared to 27 % in the OECD countries. The ratio between TSE and agricultural value added in both economies under consideration was close to the OECD average of 39 % (OECD, 2017).
In the EU, policy transfers to individual producers (PSE) are the major component of total support. In the EU, throughout the study period, the share of PSE in the total value of monetary transfers from taxpayers and consumers to the agricultural sector and agricultural producers remained at a level of around 88 %; in 2014-2016, it was twice higher than in the US (43 %; Support Estimates Database, 2018). Therefore, it may be assumed that PSE is not fully reliable in the case of the US, as it fails to take account of measures designed to support food consumption which exceed the value of support allocated to agricultural producers. In the economies considered, the importance of total transfers allocated to the sector (GSSE) was comparable throughout the study period, representing 10-11 % of total support 1 in 2014-2016 (Table 2) . One of the most widely adopted indicators of agricultural support is PSE expressed as a percentage ratio of financial support to the total receipts of agricultural producers. In EU countries and in the US, the levels of agricultural producers support have considerably declined over the last 30 years, from 39.2 % to 19.6 % in the EU and from 21.2 % to 9.5 % of the agricultural producers' receipts in the US 2 (Table 1) . Unlike in the US, the EU witnessed a stronger decrease in in the EU, these were payments based on current area, animal numbers, farm receipts or farm income by which production is required (with an average share in the PSE structure of 32 % in 1995-1997), and subsequently payments based on non-current area, animal numbers, farm receipts or farm income by which production is not required (42 % of PSE on average in 2014-2016; Table 3 ). Changes observed in the structure of EU agricultural support reflected the two key CAP reforms from 1992 and 2003. First, compensatory payments were established as a part of MacSharry reforms. Afterwards, they were replaced by a new system of direct decoupled payments. In the 2014-2016 period, compared to levels recorded in 1995-1997, payments based on current area, animal numbers, farm receipts or farm income have been cut by almost two-thirds in favour of direct payments based on non-current criteria without production requirements (OECD, 2017). In the US, there was also a trend towards payments which are less coupled with production decisions. As regards support instruments with a less distorting effect on trade and market processes, the US also used payments based on input use in addition to the two instrument categories listed above. In 2014-2016, the US recorded a similar share of these three PSE components (at a level of 21-24 % of PSE; Table 3 ). Payments based on current A/An/R/I, production required 3.6 34.6 31. The conclusions from the analysis of %PSE levels and dynamics are supported by the Producer Nominal Assistance Coefficient (NAC) analysis. From 1986 to 2016, a strong decrease in the importance of financial support for the total receipts of agricultural producers was observed (in the US and the EU, it was more noticeable before and after 1995, respectively). Afterwards, in mid-2010s, the agricultural receipts in the EU and the US was (respectively) by nearly 25 % and 10 % higher than that the farmers would earn without state aid, compared to 65 % and 27 %, respectively, in the 1986-1988 period (NAC coefficient; Table 1 ). The author has noted that despite the convergence of NAC coefficients in the study period, the financial instruments supporting the agricultural receipts were slightly more important in the EU than the average OECD level. However, producers on average with those prevailing on world markets. It can be noticed that the level of price distortions was generally falling over the period 1986-2016, and prices received by producers both in the EU and US were more closely aligned with those prevailing on world markets, as countries provide a larger share of support through less distorting measures 1 . This was reflected by the decreasing share of price support (MPS) in the PSE structure of countries covered by this study (Table 3) . For the EU countries, effective producer prices were, on average, 5 % higher than the world market prices in 2014-2016, compared with around 70 % higher in the mid-1980s (Table 1 ).
The US have made a less substantial progress in aligning process. However, already in the 1986- 2) The declining levels of support for EU and US agricultural producers were also reflected by the decreasing values of %PSE. Over the last 30 years, the share of financial support in total receipts of EU agricultural producers has considerably decreased, from 39.2 % in 1986-1988 to 19.6 % in 2014-2016 . And yet, it was nearly twice as high as in the US (9.5 % in 2014-2016 compared to 21.2 % in 1986-1988). However, it may be assumed that PSE is not fully reliable in the case of US, as it fails to take account of measures designed to support food consumption (TCT) which exceed the value of support allocated to agricultural producers. Therefore, it may be concluded that the US consumers thus become net beneficiaries of agricultural support programs whereas the burden of financial support for agricultural producers imposed on the EU consumers is usually heavier than what they receive in off-setting benefits.
3) In mid-2010s, the agricultural receipts in the EU and the US were (respectively) by nearly 25 % and 10 % higher than that the farmers would earn without state aid, compared to 65 % and 27 % (measured with the NAC coefficient), respectively, in the 1986-1988 period. However, in both economies covered by this analysis, the structure of support has undergone some positive developments: the price support measures have been gradually substituted with payments less distorting to the trade and market processes. As a consequence, prices in domestic markets of these countries have moved ever closer to the world price level. Irrespective of changes to the nature of support which have already taken place, it may be assumed that in the economies considered, there is still a potential to introduce less trade-distorting and more market-oriented policies.
4) Higher levels of support for EU agricultural producers are accompanied by higher levels of customs protection of the EU market. Having the above in mind, it may be supposed that (in the context of the potential resumption of negotiations intended to deepen the transatlantic economic ties and/or to overcome the impasse in multilateral WTO negotiations) the US, expecting a stronger export-driving effect on the economy than in the EU, would be the ones to press harder for an extensive liberalization of trade and for a progressive reduction of domestic support for the agricultural sector. This is because the expected trade creation effects, stronger than in the EU, may drive the strengthening of the US competitive position in bilateral and global trade.
